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ABSTRACT
Discounting is a means of assigning different weights
to costs expected to be incurred in different future time
periods. Such costs are a vital element of cost-effective-
ness studies, which under present Department of Defense
policy provide the primary basis for military procurement
and force structure decision making.
The discounting process is reviewed, and an attempt
is made to identify qualitatively the factors which should
determine the discount rate to be used in Department of
Defense cost-effectiveness studies. These factors are
separated into two groups: those which apply to cost-
effectiveness studies of all types of weapons systems, and
those which depend upon the type of system being considered.
Finally the manner of presenting the results of the
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The technique of discounting future costs and benefits
in order to obtain their present values is an accepted
method of converting a multlperiod problem to a static
problem in economic investment theory. The private firm
in a market economy is assumed to be a profit maxlmizer;
i.e., to act so as to maximize the difference between
revenues and costs, where both are measured in dollars.
tohen investments which Involve revenues and costs occurring
in dissimilar time periods are being considered, the firm
should invest in such a way as to maximize the difference
2between the present values of future revenues and costs.
Discounting is the technique used to obtain these present
3
values of future revenues and costs.
In government operations, and in particular in Depart-
ment of Defense operations, similar investment allocation
problems arise during the formulation of procurement pol-
icies and the planning of future force compositions. Al-
though the discounting procedure is still applicable, im-
portant complications are introduced by the absence of a
marketplace for government output. Perhaps the most seri-
ous practical difficulty introduced is that government
Roland N. McKean, Efficiency in Government through








returns cannot be measured directly as dollar revenues from
sales. A related difficulty is the determination of the
discount rate to be used in present value calculations.
This paper is concerned with the latter problem.

2. Cost-Effectiveness Studies.
Before a proper discount rate can be determined it is
necessary to describe the investment action being contem-
plated. To a large extent current major Defense Depart-
ment decisions, including investment decisions, are made on
the basis of systems analyses. Systems analyses are ana-
lytical studies of alternative means of accomplishing some
Defense Department objective. These objectives are usually
2
attained through employment of one or more weapons systems.
A3 used here , a weapons system is defined as the pri-
mary equipment needed to perform a certain mission, plus
all of the men, facilities, and equipment required for its
utilization and support. As an example consider an under-
water-launched medium range ballistic missile system. Here
the defense objective might be the ability to retaliate
against an enemy who attacks first, and by possessing this
capability to deter such an enemy attack. The capability
Statement made by Dr. Alain C. Enthoven, Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Systems Analysis), in an
address to the student body of the U. S. Naval Postgraduate
School, Monterey, California, 17 February, 1965.
o
The term ' systems analysis" is not precisely defined
in the literature. Synonymous terms in different applica-
tions are operations research, systems research, systems
design, systems engineering, management science, and cost-
effectiveness analysis. See RAND Corporation, Analysis for
Military Decisions , by E.S. Quade (ed.). RAND publication
R-3S7-FR (Santa Monica, Calif.: The RAND Corporation,
November, 1964), 3- On page four Q,uade defines systems
analysis as follows: "When used in a military context, the
label 'systems analysis' is applied very broadly to any
systematic approach to the comparison of alternatives."

desired might be measured by the ability to destroy a large
number of enemy targets after sustaining a nuclear first
strike. The weapons system itself includes not only the
required number of missiles and their submarine launching
platforms, but the trained crews, supply ships, and mainte-
nance, overhaul, and operating bases needed for their sup-
port.
The discounting procedure discussed in this paper ap-
plies primarily to procurement and force composition systems
analyses; that is, studies to decide what systems to buy or
develop now so that future military forces will have the
desired capabilities. This type of analysis is undertaken
to assist a decisionmaker, who, being faced with a general
future requirement, must decide whether to develop, buy and
operate one system or a combination of two or more systems
now. If a combination of two or more systems is viewed as
Itself comprising a system, then the decisionmaker's job
can always be described as choosing a single system from
among the alternatives.
Defense Department systems analyses have generally
evolved as economic analyses, or "cost-effectiveness" stud-
3les. Cost-effectiveness studies are so named simply be-
cause the two main system features studied are the system
cost and the system effectiveness.
System effectiveness has been a traditional concern





of effectiveness in studies of future weapons systems is
not new. The effectiveness of a system is defined as the
degree to which the system is able to accomplish a stated
objective. Although system effectiveness is easily defined,
its correct measurement is one of the most difficult prob-
lems systems analysts face. First there is the deceptively
difficult problem of choosing the correct unit of measure-
4
ment. Of equal difficulty is the problem of applying this
measure to a future situation which is pervaded by uncer-
tainties .
The cost of a system is defined to be the sum of the
real costs of the resources used by that system during a
given time period. Resource costs are measured by their
opportunity cost. That is, the cost of a resource in some
specific use is the value of that resource in its best
alternative use. Since the procurement and force compo-
sition cost-effectiveness studies which are being consid-
ered in this paper involve consideration of future time
periods, in which the supply of a given resource is not
rigidly fixed, it is perhaps safe to assume that resource
7
costs can be measured in dollars. It is because the total
4Charles J. Hitch and Roland N. McKean, The Economics
of Defense in the Nuclear Age (Cambridge: Harvard Univer-
sity Press, 1963), 179-181.
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supply of resources available to the Department of Defense
Is United that system costs become such an Important con-
Q
sideration in military cost-effectiveness studies.
Assume that the decisionmaker has been provided with
the cost and effectiveness of each of several alternative
systems proposed to accomplish an objective. The decision-
maker must choose the "best" of these systems, but what cri-
Q
terion does he use to identify that system? He could
choose the most effective system without regard to cost,
but if systems were designed to meet this criterion their
costs would undoubtedly be prohibitively high. Carried to
the extreme, the use of this criterion could result in
spending all available resources on a system which is ex-
tremely effective in some single mission, and thus being
unable to accomplish all other objectives. Alternatively,
the decisionmaker could choose the least-cost system. But
designing a system to minimize costs alone would ultimately
lead to a zero cost, zero effectiveness system. The least
cost criterion which could lead to choosing such a system
is clearly a bad one. A criterion of choosing the system
for which the ratio of system cost to system effectiveness





The next two paragraphs briefly outline the selection
of a proper decision criterion. For a more comprehensive





or effectiveness, could result In equally undesireable
choices. Similarly if cost is measured in dollars and
effectiveness is measured in some other unit, as is usually
the case in military analyses, then the criterion of choos-'
ing that system for which the difference between effective-
ness and cost is a maximum is infeasible, since that dif-
ference is undefined.
Either of two conceptually equivalent criteria appears
best. Systems can be designed so that the costs of each
system over the relevant time period are equal. If this
is done, the correct criterion is to choose the most effec-
tive of the systems. The problem in this case is determin-
ing what the fixed cost level should be, since future de-
fense budgets are not fixed. Alternatively and equiva-
lently, systems can be designed so as to have equal effec-
tiveness over the relevant time period. In this case, the
correct criterion is to choose the least-cost system. Again
the problem is to determine what the fixed effectiveness
level should be, but this is often at least roughly indi-
cated by the objective to be met. Although the discounting
procedure discussed in this paper is applicable to studies
using either of these equivalent criteria, the development
of discounting in this paper will be based on systems stud-
ies which are designed to hold the effectiveness levels of
the alternative systems equal.
An understanding of the general methodology of cost-

effectiveness studies is also important for determining
the proper discount rate. The decisionmaker first provides
a general scenario for the study. This scenario includes
the time frame for the study , the general enemy threat
posed, and a general description of friendly forces. It
may or may not include more specific guidance regarding
budget levels, enemy capabilities, allies, strategic con-
straints, etc. A project leader is appointed to direct
the study and to coordinate the efforts of the members of
the study team. Within the study team one group of ana-
lysts proposes the alternative weapons systems, devises a
measure of effectiveness, decides the level or levels at
which effectiveness will be fixed, and through operations
analysis techniques determines the configuration and number
of units required over time to achieve the desired effec-
tiveness. A second group of analysts estimates the costs of
the proposed systems, using the system configurations and
number of units required as inputs.
As summarized from a lecture by Mr. Patrick J.
Parker, Center for Naval Analyses, Naval Warfare Analysis
Group, Arlington, Va. , to the Operations Analysis curric-
ulum students of the U. 5. Naval Postgraduate School,
Monterey, Calif., November 19, 1964.
8

3. The Discounting Process.
In the last section the decision problem in cost-
effectiveness studies was limited to the case where two
or more equally effective alternative means of achieving
some objective have been identified. The criterion for
choice between these systems is that of least cost. But
what cost figures should be compared in the decision-
making process? The question arises because the costs
of the alternative systems are estimated over a future
time period, a period which usually is several years long
and which often extends over the expected useful life-
time of one or more of the systems.
It is possible that the sum of the research and de-
velopment, initial Investment, and operating costs of
one of the alternative systems will be strictly less than
the corresponding costs of each of the other systems in
every year of the time period under consideration. In
this case one system is clearly the least cost system,
and no further comparison of costs would be necessary.
However, it is often the case that one system will have
higher costs than another system in one or more years
of the time period under consideration, but that the re-
verse will be true for the remaining years. A typical
example is where one system is an existing system requir-
ing no research, development, or initial procurement, but
which will incur Increasingly heavy operating and replace-
ment costs in the future. The other system is a new
9

system requiring relatively heavy research, development
and initial investment costs, but whose operating and re-
placement costs will be relatively low once that system
becomes operational. In this more usual case the least-
cost criterion will fail to identify a preferred system,
unless the term "cost" is modified to include a specifi-
cation of how costs occuring in different time periods
are to be weighted.
The decisionmaker could give costs in all time per-
iods equal weight and compare the total costs of each
system. However, costs incurred in different time per-
iods are not equivalent, even assuming constant prices
for all resources. This is easily appreciated by con-
sidering a situation on the level of personal finances.
If a person could receive an expensive item today, would
he rather pay for it today or a year from now? Payment
a year from now is clearly preferable, since just by leav-
ing the amount of money involved in a savings account for
a year he could make the payment then and still retain the
interest earned on the account. Of course there are other
ways to make money "work" over time. Regardless of the
reason for the time preference, however, the mere existence
of a preference between present and future expenditures
is sufficient to show the non-equivalence of costs occur-
ing at different times.
It would seem that the decisionmaker should assign
10

different weights to costs occurring in different time per-
iods, and then compare the system weighted-cost totals.
This is a better procedure, but what weights should be as-
signed to costs occurring in different time periods, and how
should the total time period under consideration be sub-
divided for purposes of cost measurement?
One way of assigning different weights to costs occur-
ring in different time periods is the discounting procedure.
This procedure assumes that a discount rate exists in each
time period, not necessarily the same rate for each time
period. The discount rate is most easily explained by con-
sidering it as an interest rate. If an amount of money,
Vq , is invested today in a use offering a k% return per time
period, then the value, V,, of the Investment at the end of
one time period is
V
±
= y 4. .C4V
= (1 4- .04)V
= 1 . 04V .
Equivalently
,
the amount of money, Vq , which invested at k%
per time period will yield a return of V, is
V,
1 +- .04
If the amount is invested for two time periods at the same
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In general, let
t = number of time periods
i = interest rate in the j time period; j — l,...,t




















(1 +- i) 1
If one is interested in computing Vx , given V and i.,° t j
J =: l,...,t, then the i, are called interest rates. If it
is desired to compute V*
n ,
given V and the i , then the i
v t j j
are called discount rates.
The same discounting procedures can be applied to costs.
12

If our time preference is such that we consider the payment
of a cost of C now as equivalent to the payment of an in-
creased amount, — G +- iC » one time period from now,
then to obtain the present value of that future cost, G
must be discounted by 1; that is,
(1+i) 1
Similarly, assuming that our time preference remains con-
stant from year to year, the present value of a cost which
will be incurred t time periods from now is
C
c - t
The present value of the sum of the costs which will be
incurred in each of t future time periods is given by
t C
3=1 (1 4- i) J
Note that the weighting factor applied to costs in different
time periods here is (1+ iH, and not the discount rate,
i, itself.
Theoretically, the non-equivalence of costs in differ-
ent time periods leads to continuously varying the weight-
ing factor applied to costs over time. That is, the total
time period under consideration should be divided into in-
finitesimal increments. However, if the length of the total
time period is several years, as it is in studies of weapons
systems over their expected useful lives, then the choice of
yearly time increments should provide a number of time
13

periods over which to discount costs adequate to reflect the
influence of time preferences. The breakdown of the total
time period under consideration into yearly increments is
convenient for Defense Department cost-effectiveness stud-
ies, since historical cost data are generally maintained In
the government by fiscal year. Also, the choice of the fis-
cal year as the basic time period is compatible both with
Congressional allocation of money to the various govern-
mental departments and with the Department of Defense pro-
gramming system.
It is generally considered that two factors combine to
pdetermine the discount (interest) rate. The first of these
is the factor already considered; that is, the time prefer-
ence of the investor. If the discount rate accounted for
only this factor, then for a given time preference the de-
gree to which a future cost or benefit would be discounted
to obtain its present value would depend only upon the re-
moteness of that cost or benefit. However, the discount
(interest) rate should also reflect the degree of risk in-
volved. Thus the interest rate on loans is higher the more
likely it becomes that the cost will never be incurred.
The discount rate will hereinafter be thought of as
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comp-
troller) Programming, Directorate for Systems Planning,
Study Report on the Programming System for the Office of
the Secretary of De fense . Washington: June 25, 1962.
2J.R. Hicks, Value and Capital . (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1946), 142-143-
14

being the sum of these two factors. That is,
i«— ju "*" 1R J — 1 » • • • > t ,
where i , „ Is the normative factor of the discount rate in
time period j, and i
,
R is the risk premium factor of that
discount rate. In the case of Defense Department force
composition cost-effectiveness studies, it seems reasonable
to assume that neither would the Defense Department's time
preference vary in any predictable manner over future years,
nor would the degree of riskiness of a given defense system
cost vary from year to year, except as a function of its
remoteness from the present. Making these assumptions;
i.e., that
JN N
[ for all J= l,...,t,
the equation for the present value of the sum of the costs
expected to occur in each of t future years becomes
C - 2_
-r •
j=l (1 + i N -h iR)J
The solution to the problem of what weights to assign
costs occurring in different time periods for these Defense
Department cost-effectiveness studies now depends upon find-
ing what values to assign to i and i .
15

4. The Normative Component.
This section considers the component of the discount
rate that reflects only the time preference of the Depart-
ment of Defense, which is independent of the riskiness of
the investment projects being considered. That is, we seek
the normative component, i„ , which when added to the risk
component, 1R , comprises the proper discount rate for mili-
tary cost-effectiveness studies.
At first we continue to consider the discount rate
as an interest rate. One suggestion for determining which
interest rate applies to government projects is to use the
1
rate at which the government can borrow funds. The idea
here is that the government raises marginal funds by borrow-
ing, and hence the government borrowing rate is a measure
of the government's time preference. Since the Department
of Defense cannot borrow by itself, but rather must have the
government borrow for it, the rate at which the government
borrows would seem to be applicable to the Department of
Defense. Since the defense investments under consideration
are typically long term projects, the most suitable govern-
ment borrowing to consider would be the interest rate on
long term government bonds. This rate has the further advan-
tage of being as risk-free a rate as can be found.
Charles J. Hitch and Roland N. McKean, The Economics




Using this rate, say rv , the argument for discounting
future costs is analogous to the example of the private lend-
er presented in the last section. If the government borrows
and spends an amount CQ today, it would have to repay C, =
(1+rg) Cq one year from now.
The critical assumption leading to the use of this
rate is that the government must finance marginal invest-
ments by borrowing. It is an invalid assumption for sev-
eral reasons. The defense investment projects under con-
sideration are assumed to be long term projects; i.e., they
incur costs over a period of several years. Neither the
Defense Department budget nor the federal budget can be
considered as fixed over such a time period. Hence if the
costs are programmed in advance they can be financed through
taxation, with tax rates being adjusted as required. Even
in the short term, fixed budget case, the government is not
limited to borrowing as a means of raising funds. For in-
stance, the government can create new money and adjust future
monetary and fiscal policies as necessary to compensate
for its Impact on the economy. The rate at which the gov-
ernment can borrow funds must be rejected as a measure of
iN , then, on the grounds that although it is a conveniently
measured risk- free rate, it is simply not relevant to the
situation being considered.
One writer has suggested that the rate at which the
marginal utility of a good decreases per unit increase in
17

the available quantity of the good should be the basis for
pdiscounting future values. The national product is thought
of as the "good" Involved. The argument is stated as follows
"Since the national product will Increase from
year to year in a well-run economy, the resources
diverted to investment from this year's Income
should be weighted more heavily than the resources
paid back next year by that investment. Thus the
present cost of an investment should be weighted
more heavily than its future savings, not because
the savings are deferred in time, but because the
savings are part of a larger national product
per capita than was the initial cost, and hence
represent a lower marginal utility. "3
It would appear that the same reasoning could be applied to
discounting future costs as is suggested above for discount-
ing future savings, or returns.
There is little doubt that the Defense Department
would place a higher marginal utility on each dollar if it
were constrained to operate within a relatively low yearly
budget. Presumably both the amount of defense output (ef-
fectiveness) required, as determined by the degree of enemy
threat, and the amount of inputs required to produce that
output, as determined by the state of technology, would re-
main constant within a given year, so that the availability
and use of additional inputs would produce diminishing re-
turns. Hence the marginal utility of the inputs, dollars in
2E. 3. Berman, "The Normative Interest Rate", RAND




this case, would decrease as their supply increased.
The introduction of the time dimension, however, may
render the marginal utility concept inapplicable. Consider
a Defense Department objective of being able to destroy a
certain number of enemy targets. Assume that the forces
have been organized ("produced") in such a way as to accom-
plish that objective this year, at a certain cost, C
,
paid out of this year's budget. Assume that the growth of
national product results in an increase in the Defense De-
partment budget next year. Assume also that the defense
objective remains unchanged from this year to next year,
but that the enemy develops a better defensive capability
against our existing forces. Suppose that the nature of our
forces and the technological means of producing them re-
mains unchanged, so that more units must be produced in or-
der to meet the objective. In this case the money available
to purchase inputs is increased, but so is the number of
units required. The marginal utility of money, which is a
measure of the satisfaction derived from the marginal dollar,
may next year be greater than, equal to, or less than the
marginal utility of money this year, depending upon the re-
lation between the percent increase in the defense budget and
the percent increase in the input requirements. Diminishing
marginal returns remain characteristic of the production pro-
cess, but their effect may be offset by the increased utili-
ty of the marginal unit, in the relevant range.
19

An easily understood analogy is provided by people and
their incomes. As a person's income rises (until very high
incomes are reached) he becomes accustomed to more expensive
and varied goods, and he incurs more expensive recurring ob-
ligations. If the person's Job is such that increasing so-
cial demands are placed on him as his income Increases, it
sometimes happens that his expenditure "requirements"
(those expenditures which he feels are necessary) increase
faster than his income. In such a situation it is likely
that at the lower income his satisfaction is at a certain
level, whereas at the higher income his satisfaction is
relatively lower, because of his changing tastes and obli-
gations. The marginal utility of money to him is higher in
the latter case , even though the amount of money he controls
has Increased. In terms of Indifference curve analysis,
his utility isoquants have moved away from the origin faster
over time than has his opportunity line (assuming an oppor-
tunity line of constant slope and unchanged shapes of the
utility isoquants). *-J
^For a basic explanation of indifference curve analysis
for individual income allocation and resource allocation by
a firm, see Richard H. Leftwich, The Price System and Re -
source Allocation (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston,
I960), 69-79 and 126-135-
^For an application of indifference curve analysis to
capital budgeting, see Jack Hirshleifer, "an Isoquant Ap-
proach to Investment Decision Problems", RAND publication
P-1158 (August 23, 1957).
20

The rate of growth of national product, and of the De-
partment of Defense budget, is therefore rejected because
the diminishing marginal utility assumption does not neces-
sarily apply to the Defense Department when costs are to be
incurred over time.
A third suggestion is that the proper discount rate to
be used is the rate of return on the marginal private in-
vestment. When national investment resources are opti-
mally allocated the rates of return on marginal investments
should be the same in both the public and private sectors.
The return referred to is the return to capital (i.e.,
production equipment, inventories, education, research)
made possible by the marginal productivity of capital.
The rate of return on a defense investment is usually
impossible to measure directly, since the costs and returns
of such an investment are incommensurable. Investment costs
are usually measured in dollars, whereas the returns are in
such units as ability to destroy enemy targets, or more gen-
erally, "military effectiveness units". Congress allocates
investment funds to the various governmental departments
through its control of the yearly budget. Presumably Con-
gress attempts to do so in such a way that the marginal re-
turns on investments in each of the departments is equalized
Therefore, an appropriate measure of the marginal rate of




return to Defense Department investments should be the mar-
ginal rate of return on Investments of other governmental de-
partments.
The same measurement problem exists in other govern-
mental departments, however, as in the Department of Defense.
Except for a few relatively small scale operations, the re-
turns on government Investments are not measureable in dol-
7lars. What is the dollar value, for instance, of the in-
tergovernmental communications channels maintained oy For-
eign Service Officers of the State Department? The return
on governmental investments usually contains a substantial
o
non-monetary direct return to the welfare of the country.
Congress not only allocates funds within the government,
but in deciding on the magnitude of the budget, Congress
presumably allocates funds to the government in such a way
that the marginal return on governmental investments is
equated to the marginal return on investments in the pri-
vate sector. Since governmental returns and private returns
are generally incommensurable, it is granted that Congress'
allocation decisions are made on a subjective rather than a
7
For the results of an attempt to measure the dollar out-
put of certain activities of the Department of the Interior,
see RAND Corporation, A Case Study in the Measurement of
Government Output , by W. A. Vogely. RAND Corporation publi-
cation RM-1934-RC (Santa Monica, Calif.: The RAND Corpora-
tion, July 9, 1957).
Q
Berman
, op . clt . , 2-4.
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strictly quantitative basis. Nevertheless, these alloca-
tions are made, and presumably the intent of Congress is to
make them optimally.
If it is assumed that Congress is able to, and does,
allocate the national income so as to equalize the marginal
rates of return in the public and private sectors, for
given yearly national Incomes, then the rate of return on
the marginal governmental Investment, and in particular the
rate of return on the marginal investment within the Depart-
ment of Defense, can be quantified by measuring the rate
of return on the marginal private investment at given yearly
incomes. If it is further assumed that long run competitive
equilibrium exists in the private sector, so that for a
given national product and degree of risk each investment
opportunity will yield the same rate of return (i.e., all
firms are operating at the margin), then an average over
degrees of risk of the rates of return to investment in the
private sector would provide a measure for the rate of re-
turn to marginal Defense Department investments having that
same (private industry average) degree of risk. The rate so
determined would not serve as the risk-free normative rate
originally sought, but it could nevertheless serve as i
if the risk factor were redefined to encompass only the ad-
ditional risk of the investment under consideration.
Berman maintains that the marginal rate of return to
investment in the private sector is not a clearly defined
23

measure , because it varies with the level of total invest-
9
ment considered. It is true that the marginal rate of re-
turn is inversely related to the total investment level, if
the generally accepted assumption of diminishing marginal
returns to capital is made. Berman's argument is that
since the government can control the total level of in-
vestment by fiscal and monetary policies aimed at control-
ling the growth rate of national product, the government
should not use the marginal rate of return in the private
sector as a fixed constraint on its Investment planning.
In the context of this paper, that of the Department
of Defense making investment decisions between alternatives
available within that department, however, the Department
of Defense must consider the investment level in the private
sector as a factor Independent of its operations. The Pres-
ident recommends fiscal policies leading to a desired growth
rate of national product. These policies are modified and
approved by Congress. The desired growth rate determines
the level of total investment for the economy. Through its
control of the federal budget Congress essentially allo-
cates investment funds between the private and public sectors





George J. Stigler, The Theory of Price (revised edition
New York: The MacMillan Company, 1952), 111.
24

the rates of return in the private and public sectors are
equalized. Hence for a governmental policy promoting any
rate of national growth, a policy which the Department of
Defense neither recommends nor determines, the Department
of Defense can consider the rate of return in the private
sector of the economy as an independent measure of the rate
of return to its own investment activities.
To make actual measurements on the rate of return to
average risk private investments, values of national prod-
uct and the desired growth rate, and hence the level of in-
vestment, must be specified. Historical information will
not tell us what the rate of return would have been had the
investment level been different, so measurements must be
made on actual past rates of returns to investments.
If the desired growth rate, and hence future national
products and investment levels, are not known, then perhaps
the best approximation is to assume that historical national
products and investment levels determined by governmental
monetary and fiscal policies reflect the desired growth
rate. Then if it is assumed again that private firms are
operating at the margin, the marginal rate of return on in-
vestment in the private sector, averaged over the degrees
For a treatment of how governmental policies affect
the Interest rate, see H. Liebenstein , "Economic Develop-
ment and the Rate of Interest Under Dictatorial Conditions",
RAND publication P-808 (Feb. 28, 1956).
25

of risk Involved, could be obtained by computing the yearly
rate of return at each risk level, averaged over a number of
recent years, and then weighting these rates according to
the proportion of total investment funds which were used at
the various risk levels in order to get an over-all average.
This is essentially the approach taken by one private re-
search corporation under Navy contract to determine what
interest rate should be used in evaluating the holding
12
cost of military Inventory. The average rate of return on
real capital Investment in the American economy was measured
to be 16. 5#. 13
The marginal rate of return on investment in the pri-
vate sector of the economy is accepted as the appropriate
measure of the redefined normative component of the discount
rate which the Department of Defense should use in procure-
ment and force structure cost-effectiveness studies. The
redefined normative component is the component of the dis-
count rate which measures the Defense Department's time
preference in investment decisions involving a degree of risk
equal to that of the average investment in the private sec-
tor.
•^Planning Research Corporation, The Interest Cost of
Holding Military Inventory , by J. A. Stockfisch. P. R. C.
report number PRO R-156 (Los Angeles, Calif.: Planning Re-
search Corporation, May 5, I960).
13 Ibid . , 14.
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5. The Risk Component.
The risk premium component of the discount rate orig-
inally was defined as the factor by which the normative
component of the discount rate must be modified to reflect
the riskiness of the investment; i.e., the likelihood that
the returns or costs will never be incurred. Since the mar-
ginal rate of return to average risk investments in the pri-
vate sector has been chosen as the measure of i__ it is clear
that i^ must be redefined. The normative component as cho-
sen already includes an average allowance for risk. We re-
define the risk premium component, in, to be the factor by
which the normative component, 1„ , must be modified to re-
flect the difference in degree of risk between the type of
investment being considered to meet the defense objective
and the average investment in the private sector.
In order to assess the riskiness of an investment we
must determine exactly what is meant by risk. There are
three major reasons why military investments are risky.
First, the actual effectiveness of a system being Invested
in may be less than anticipated, and in fact may never be
realized at all. Secondly, a system may actually cost more
or less than is estimated at the time of the investment
Charles J. Hitch and Roland N. McKean, The Economics
of Defense in the Nuclear Age (Cambridge: Harvard Univer-
sity Press, 19637, 210.
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decision. Thirdly, anticipated future costs may never be
incurred.
The uncertainty as to the degree of effectiveness which
will be achieved by the system stems from several source.s.
Perhaps the system cannot be developed as planned because
a technological barrier is encountered. In this case the
system probably would be developed, but at a lesser effec-
tiveness than planned. The performance characteristics
might have to be changed; lower speed, less payload , etc.
The system's survivability, or ability to survive an enemy
offensive attack, might be diminished. The reliability of
the system might be lowered, resulting in mission aborts
and hence less offensive units on target. Or the ability
of the weapon system to overcome enemy defenses at the tar-
get might be diminished, again resulting in less targets de-
stroyed.
The structure and methodology of the cost-effectiveness
studies under consideration indicate that the degree of un-
certainty in future effectiveness should not be reflected in
the risk component of the discount rate. This uncertainty
is more properly treated in these studies by the effective-
ness analysts than by the cost analysts. Having set a de-
sired level of effectiveness, it is the effectiveness ana-
lysts' Job to compute the required number and type of units
for which the cost analysts are to estimate system costs. If
the effectiveness analysts are uncertain of the number and
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type of units which will be required to attain the desired
level of effectiveness because of technological uncertainty,
then these analysts should run a sensitivity analysis. Such
an analysis would yield several different combinations of
type and number of units required, as a function of input
assumptions made on the technological feasibility of producing
the desired system. Each of these combinations could then
be costed separately by the cost analysts.
Next consider the uncertainty of the cost estimates
made for a specific system. Cost estimates are uncertain
2for a number of reasons. Prices may be different at the
time costs are to be incurred than expected. It may be pos-
sible to make general price level adjustments to system costs,
but the actual prices which will apply cannot be predicted
with certainty. Different cost analysts working on the same
study may use somewhat different methods, or may differ in
their competence. Hence the costs estimated may depend upon
who estimated them. The cost estimating relationships, such
as linear estimating equations^ and learning curve calcula-
p
RAND Corporation, A Discussion of Uncertainty in Cost
Analysis, by G. H. Fisher. RAND publication RM- 3071- PR (San-
ta Monica, Calif.: The RAND Corporation, April, 1962), 12-19
For a discussion of the use of statistical regression
analysis in deriving estimating relationships, see RAND Cor-
poration, Derivation of Estimating: Relationships: An Illus -
trative Example , by G. H. Fisher. RAND publication RM-3366-
PR (Santa Monica, Calif.: The RAND Corporation, Nov., 1962.
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4tions , may be in error, resulting in erroneous cost esti-
mates. Even if the cost estimating relationships are cor-
rect, the historical cost data on which future costs are
based may be inaccurate. Finally, even if the data and cost
estimating relationships are correct it is often necessary
to extrapolate beyond the range of the past data in making
estimates of future costs.
It is tempting to account for cost estimating uncer-
tainty in the risk component of the discount rate, and such
a procedure has been proposed ["51. The less certain an in-
vestor is of how much it will cost to obtain a given return,
the less likely he is to make the investment. Notice, how-
ever, that the more future costs are discounted (i.e., the
higher the discount rate), the more likely that investment
is to be chosen in comparison with alternative investments
which provide the same total return. To decrease the chance
that an investment having highly uncertain costs would be
chosen
t
it would be necessary to decrease the risk compo-
nent of the discount rate. This would imply setting i^ at
some arbitrary rate for investments with no cost estimating
uncertainty, and then decreasing that rate in proportion to
the variability of the costs of investments having cost es-
timating uncertainty. But the variance of the cost estimate
4
For a discussion of cost-quantity calculations, see
RAND Corporation, Cost-Quantity Calculator , by J. W. Noah
and R. W. Smith. RAND publication RM-2786-PR (Santa Monica,
Calif.: The RAND Corporation, Jan., 1962).
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extends the possible costs to values both above and below
the estimated cost, conceivably ranging from zero to infi-
nite cost.
Consider the actual cost in time period t as a random
variable, C+, having a subjectively assigned probability
density function, f^ (o^), characterized by the estimated
cost as its mode and by some unknown mean and variance.
That is,
G = actual cost in time period t, a random variable
distributed as fQ (c t ) for < c t < <x>




Then the probability density function of G t might have a




Such a graph would reflect the analyst's evaluation of c^
as the single most likely value of C , and would also re-
flect his knowledge that more historical estimates have
proved to be too low than too high.




pletely certain cost estimate. Then if iR is reduced to
account for some amount of uncertainty (variance) in c\ , it
is clear that the present value of c t can only become larger.
Let Cq - present value of c. when io —



















c Q (1 + iN - k)
t
(1
-I- ijj) 1 > (1




'0 ^ "0 >
or
c = Cq -\- K, K a positive valued function of k.
If the actual value of C. turns out to be greater than
c. , then we would want its present value to be greater than
Cq, and the reduction of the discount rate would produce
that effect. Cn the other hand, if the realized value of
C^ is less than c , then we would want its present value to
be less than Cq. This result cannot be produced by reducing
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the discount rate, as shown above. And vet by assigning the
estimated cost, c. t as the mode of a subjective probability
distribution of G
t ,
the cost analyst has admitted that G.
may take on a value less than c^. The analyst cannot both
decrease the discount rate to account for costs higher than
those estimated and increase the discount rate to account
for costs lower than those estimated at the same time.
Another method for accounting for cost variability must be
found
.
Perhaps the best method available for this purpose is
5
sensitivity analysis. That is, for each specific system
being analyzed, the cost analyst should assign several dif-
ferent sets of prices as inputs, and then present the re-
sulting best cost estimates as his output. The decision-
maker can obtain a feeling for the degree of uncertainty in
the cost estimates from these results.
Finally, consider the possibility that future costs
(
may never be incurred. The threat posed by the enemy may
change, so that the systems being studied may be discontin-
ued at some time within the time period of the study. This
is analogous to changes in customer taste in commercial in-
vestment planning, but is perhaps even more likely to occur
than in private Industry in today's rapidly changing world.
^For an alternative method based on an expectation-
variance principle which establishes the risk component at
some specified level of confidence, see J. M. English and
R. H. Hasse, "Economic Selection of Alternative Risk Invest-
ments." RAND publication F-2869 (Feb., 1964).
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Or perhaps the military systems being considered will be-
come technologically obsolete within the time period of the
study, and hence will be replaced by a new system as a re-
sult of future procurement or force structure cost-effective-
ness studies. The rapid turnover in combat aircraft pro-
vides an historical example of this phenomenon. The pos-
sibility also exists that a previously approved program of
one of the services could be prematurely terminated because
of an administrative failure by that service to present
proper and convincing program data within the framework of
the Department of Defense programming system. Or economic
conditions might deteriorate in the future, so that it would
be economically undesireable to continue an approved system
because of total budget limitations.
It is important to distinguish the difference between
the uncertainty about costs caused by the variability of
cost estimates and that caused by the possible situation in
which the costs are accurately estimated, but never are in-
curred. The former uncertainty should be accounted for by a
cost sensitivity analysis. The degree to which the system
costs might never be incurred is the part of investment risk
which should be reflected by the risk component of the dis-
count rate. Actually, having chosen the marginal rate of
return to average-risk investments in the private sector as
the measure of i N , it is the greater or lesser likelihood
that future system costs will not be incurred, as compared
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to the average-risk private industry investment, that should
determine iR . Because of the changing threat posed by the
enemy and the high rate of technological obsolescence which
affect military systems, it is reasonable to assume that for
most types of systems considered the risk component of the
discount rate would be positive, and, for many of these
cases, quite large.
To illustrate why the likelihood of non-occurrence of
future costs should be included in the discount rate
,
con-
sider the following situation. The defense objective is to
have the ability to destroy a certain number of enemy tar-
gets after sustaining an offensive strike by the enemy. Two
systems are. designed so that the system characteristics and
number of units contemplated are such that an equal level
of effectiveness is expected to be achieved by both systems
in each of the next T years. The sum of research and devel-
•
opment, initial investment, and operating costs are estimated
for each system in each of the T years. A plot of costs

















Assume that the present values of the total costs; that is,
the total costs discounted by i N , for systems A and 3 are
very nearly equal. System A is a bomber force of which sev-
eral units are operational at year zero. Operating costs for
this system will increase ap the bombers wear out, and per-
haps new Units of these bombers will have to be procured be-
fore year T. System B is an as yet undeveloped land based
missile system. Initially the development and procurement
costs will be high for this system, but once operational the
operating costs will be low. Assume further that at year
zero it is considered fairly likely that one or both of two
things might happen sometime before year T: (1) a disarm-
ament agreement will be made with the enemy, and/or (2)
system G, a superior submarine-based missile system, will
become available which would replace either system A or sys-
tem 3. Since we feel that some of the later costs of both
system A and system 3 may not be incurred, we should prefer
to choose now the system whose earlier costs are the lower,
in this case system A. Introducing an additional positive
risk component, i R , into the discounting procedure would
lead to system A having a lower present value of total cost
than system 3, and hence for equal effectiveness, system A
being the preferred system.
To summarize, the risk component, iR , of the discount
rate is a measure of the degree to which it is likely that
estimated future costs will never be incurred, as compared
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with average investment conditions in the private sector
of the economy. The degree to which it is likely that
future costs will not be incurred depends upon the type
of systems being considered, and not on the characteristics
of the individual systems themselves. Since the magnitude
of this element of cost uncertainty depends upon a sub-
jective probability, the 1 component of the discount rate
R
should be assigned subjectively by the study group.
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6. Presentation of Results.
After the effectiveness and cost calculations and the
sensitivity tests on each have been made by the analysts of
a cost-effectiveness study, the results obtained must be pre-
sented to the decisionmaker in a form which will enable him
to apply his decision criteria in choosing between the sys-
tems studied. The criterion considered in this paper is
least cost for a given level of effectiveness.
Assuming this decision criterion, the decisionmaker
must be told at what level effectiveness has been fixed in
the study. A rationale for choosing the measure of effec-
tiveness used in the study should be given. Also, an effec-
tiveness sensitivity analysis should be presented to show
the effect that different input assumptions would have on
system characteristics and the number of units required.
Since sensitivity tests of a complex system must be limited
to consideration of a relatively small number of "interesting"
parameter combinations, the decisionmaker can get a good
feeling for the effectiveness risk of the systems if he is
provided with the analysts' rationale of why the chosen para-
meter combinations were "interesting".
The next data the decisionmaker needs are the system
costs. Costs should be presented in each of three different
forms. First the undiscounted estimated yearly costs should
be presented for each system. This time stream of cost oc-
currence may indicate to the decisionmaker that one or more
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systems simply cost too much in a given year, and are there-
fore infeasible. If, for instance, the Five Year Force
Structure and Financial Plan has already programmed a high
peak of costs in some particular year, then it would be de-
sireable to avoid heavy additional costs in that year in
order to maintain a degree of balance in the total defense
budget over time.
Secondly, the present value of the total cost of each
system, discounted by i only, should be presented. The
normative component of the discount rate applies to all De-
partment of Defense investment programs, regardless of the
type of systems being considered. Presentation of this dis-
counted cost provides a single cost figure for each system,
one which is more meaningful than would be an undiscounted
total system cost figure.
Finally, the present value of the total cost of each
system, discounted by the sum of iD and 1 , should be pre-
sented. Insofar as the analysts have subjectively assigned
the proper value to the risk component, this completely dis-
counted total cost figure will be a more meaningful measure
of total system cost than the total cost discounted by the
normative component alone. Since the value of this figure
depends upon what subjective value of 1 was assigned by the
R
analysts, the rationale for assigning that value should be
presented to the decisionmaker, as well as the sensitivity
of fully discounted total system costs to higher and lower
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values of 1 .
All three of these cost figures, the time stream of
undlscounted costs, the partially discounted total system
cost, and the fully discounted total system cost, should be
presented not only for the single best estimate of the system
characteristics and number of units required, but also for
each of the variations resulting from the effectiveness sen-
sitivity analysis. In addition, the sensitivity of these
cost figures to cost variability should be presented so that
the decisionmaker can get a feeling for the degree of un-
certainty in the cost estimates.
If the various sensitivity analyses result in one system
being preferred under certain conditions and another system
being preferred under others, then the decisionmaker must
make his selection between systems subjectively. However,
the quantitative data available and the rationales presented
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